In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 180--200 (2011)
Intuitively, it seems that some belief-forming practices have the following three properties: 1. They are rational practices, and the beliefs that we form by means of these practices are themselves rational or justified beliefs. 2. Even if in most cases these practices reliably lead to correct beliefs (i.e., beliefs in true propositions), they are not infallible: it is possible for beliefs that are formed by means of these practices to be incorrect (i.e., to be beliefs in false propositions). 3. The rationality of these practices is basic or primitive. That is, the rationality of these practices is not due simply to the availability, by means of some process of reasoning that relies purely on other practices, of a rational or justified belief in the reliability of these practices. How can there be such practices? This paper offers an answer to that question.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):513-530.
Perceptual Fundamentalism and a Priori Bootstrapping.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
Similar books and articles
Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis.Richard Foley - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. pp. 37-47.
Alston's Epistemology of Religious Belief and the Problem of Religious Diversity.Julian Willard - 2001 - Religious Studies 37 (1):59-74.
Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief.David Christensen - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Rationality, Justification, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate.Harold Langsam - 2007 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):79 - 101.
God's Nature and the Rationality of Religious Belief.Chris Eberle - 1997 - Faith and Philosophy 14 (2):152-169.
The a Priori Rules of Rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):113-131.
Rationality, Reliability, and Natural Selection.Richard H. Feldman - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (June):218-27.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads131 ( #36,714 of 2,172,023 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #56,609 of 2,172,023 )
How can I increase my downloads?