Rational 'ought' implies 'can'

Philosophical Issues 23 (1):70-92 (2013)

Authors
Ralph Wedgwood
University of Southern California
Abstract
Every kind of ‘ought’ implies some kind of ‘can’ – but there are many kinds of ‘ought’ and even more kinds of ‘can’. In this essay, I shall focus on a particular kind of ‘ought’ – specifically, on what I shall call the “rational ‘ought’”. On every occasion of use, this kind of ‘ought’ is focused on the situation of a particular agent at a particular time; but this kind of ‘ought’ is concerned, not with how that agent acts at that time, but with what beliefs or intentions the agent has at the time, or with the sort of reasoning by means of which the agent at that time forms or revises those beliefs or intentions
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DOI 10.1111/phis.12004
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Masked Abilities and Compatibilism.M. Fara - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):843-865.

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Citations of this work BETA

Deontological Evidentialism and Ought Implies Can.Luis Oliveira - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2567-2582.
When Propriety is Improper.Kevin Blackwell & Daniel Drucker - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):367-386.
Rationality as a Virtue.Ralph Wedgwood - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):319-338.
The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):209-226.

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