The aim of belief

Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is often said, metaphorically, that belief "aims" at the truth. This paper proposes a normative interpretation of this metaphor. First, the notion of "epistemic norms" is clarified, and reasons are given for the view that epistemic norms articulate essential features of the beliefs that are subject to them. Then it is argued that all epistemic norms--including those that specify when beliefs count as rational, and when they count as knowledge--are explained by a fundamental norm of correct belief, which requires that, if one considers a proposition at all, one should believe it if and only if it is true.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,934

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Aim of Belief.Timothy Hoo Wai Chan (ed.) - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.
Transparency, Doxastic Norms, and the Aim of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2013 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):59-74.
The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth: Reflections on Rosenberg.Matthew Chrisman - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 357-382.
Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):511-534.
Weighing the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395-405.
On the aim of belief.David Velleman - 1996 - In J. David Velleman (ed.), The Possibility of Practical Reason. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo). pp. 244--81.
Weighing the Aim of Belief Again.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):141-145.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
881 (#26,140)

6 months
53 (#98,390)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ralph Wedgwood
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.
The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.

View all 334 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.

View all 50 references / Add more references