The a priori rules of rationality

Abstract
Both these ideas are intuitively plausible: rationality has an external aim, such as forming a true belief or good decision; and the rationality of a belief or decision is determined purely by facts about the thinker’s internal mental states. Unlike earlier conceptions, the conception of rationality presented here explains why these ideas are both true. Rational beliefs and decisions, it is argued, are those that are formed through the thinker’s following ‘rules of rationality’. Some rules count as rules of rationality because it is rational to believe---through following other rules---that those rules are reliable. But there must also be certain basic rules, which are a priori, or ‘built into’ our basic cognitive capacities. That these rules are a priori is a purely internal matter; and in following these rules the thinker has done all that could reasonably be expected to achieve the external aim of forming a true belief or good decision.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0031-8205  
DOI 10.2307/2653460
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,756
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Assertion, Moore, and Bayes.Igor Douven - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361-375.
Reliabilism and Brains in Vats.Jon Altschul - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):257-272.
The Metaethicists' Mistake.Ralph Wedgwood - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):405–426.
The Epistemological Argument for Content Externalism.Brad Majors & Sarah Sawyer - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 39 (1):257-280.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The “Rationality Wars” in Psychology: Where They Are and Where They Could Go.Thomas Sturm - 2012 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):66-81.
Logical Rules and the a Priori: Good and Bad Questions.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2007 - In Jean-Yves Béziau & Alexandre Costa-Leite (eds.), Perspectives on Universal Logic. pp. 111--122.
Primitively Rational Belief-Forming Processes.Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 180--200.
Order Relations Among Efficient Decision Rules.Jacob Paroush - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (3):209-218.
A Peircean Theory of Decision.Berit Brogaard - 1999 - Synthese 118 (3):383-401.
Internalism Explained.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):349-369.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

74 ( #71,849 of 2,178,111 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #316,663 of 2,178,111 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums