The Essence of Response-Dependence

European Review of Philosophy 3:31-54 (1997)
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Abstract

Many philosophers have thought that colours or flavours or values are in some way less objective than shape or mass or motion. This paper explores the approach to capturing this thought that is based on the idea of ‘ response-dependence ’. First, it is argued that the conceptions of response-dependence developed by Mark Johnston, Philip Pettit and Crispin Wright fail to capture this thought adequately. Then, the rest of the paper proposes an alternative conception, based in part on Kit Fine's notion of " essence ", which looks more likely to succeed in capturing the thought adequately

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Ralph Wedgwood
University of Southern California

References found in this work

Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.
The seas of language.Michael Dummett - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
How to speak of the colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.

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