The metaethicists' mistake

Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):405–426 (2004)
According to normative judgment internalism (NJI), normative judgments -- that is, judgments of the form 'I ought to F' and the like -- are "essentially practical", in the sense that they are in some way essentially connected to practical reasoning, or to motivation for action. Many metaethicists believe that if NJI is true, then it would cast grave doubts on any robustly realist (RR) conception of normative judgments. These metaethicists are mistaken. This mistake about the relations between NJI and RR seems to be due to hasty and undefended assumptions about the nature of belief. Any philosophical conception of belief that has the resources to deal with Frege's Puzzle (how to explain the apparent failures of referential transparency in belief ascriptions) will also have the resources to reconcile NJI and RR with respect to normative judgments.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00035.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,178
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Mind, Value, and Reality.John Henry McDowell - 1998 - Harvard University Press.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Moral Concepts and Motivation.Mark Greenberg - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):137-164.
An Argument Against Motivational Internalism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2):135-156.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Qualitative Judgments, Quantitative Judgments, and Norm-Sensitivity.Paul Egré - 2010 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 33 (4):335-336.
Normative Practical Reasoning: John Broome.John Broome - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175–193.
Normative Practical Reasoning.Christian Piller - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175 - 216.
Being For.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Normative Concepts and Motivation.François Schroeter - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5 (3):1-23.
Against Essential Normativity of the Mental.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):263 - 283.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

105 ( #47,192 of 2,163,694 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #62,626 of 2,163,694 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums