The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons’

Philosophical Issues 25 (1):123-143 (2015)

Authors
Ralph Wedgwood
University of Southern California
Abstract
Many philosophers working on the branches of philosophy that deal with the normative questions have adopted a " Reasons First" program. This paper criticizes the foundational assumptions of this program. In fact, there are many different concepts that can be expressed by the term 'reason' in English, none of which are any more fundamental than any others. Indeed, most of these concepts are not particularly fundamental in any interesting sense
Keywords reasons  motivation  normativity
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DOI 10.1111/phis.12054
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.T. M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Deliberation, Reasons, and Alternatives.Justin Snedegar - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Are Epistemic Reasons Perspective-Dependent?Davide Fassio - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-31.

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