The Right Thing to Believe

In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 123-139 (2013)

Authors
Ralph Wedgwood
University of Southern California
Abstract
Many philosophers have claimed that “belief aims at the truth”. But is there any interpretation of this claim on which it counts as true? According to some philosophers, the best interpretation of the claim takes it as the normative thesis that belief is subject to a truth-norm. The goal of this essay is to clarify this normative interpretation of the claim. First, the claim can be developed so that it applies to partial beliefs as well as to flat-out full beliefs. Secondly, an answer is given to the objection that has been raised against the claim that belief is subject to a truth-norm of this sort by Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi; responding to this objection will involve careful reflection on the structure of normative concepts, and of how these normative concepts apply to belief.
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References found in this work BETA

The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (s16):267-97.
On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
The Seas of Language.Michael Dummett - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Does Thought Imply Ought?Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):277–285.
Intention.P. L. Heath & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.
Believing at Will is Possible.Rik Peels - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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