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The Weight of Moral Reasons
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (Ed. Mark Timmons) 3:35-58 (2013)
Abstract
This paper starts by giving an interpretation of the notorious question "Why be moral?" Then, to answer that question, it develops an account of why some moral reasons -- specifically, the moral reasons that ground moral requirements -- are sufficiently weighty that they outweigh all countervailing reasons for action.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
From rights to prerogatives.Daniel Muñoz - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):608-623.
Morality and Practical Reasons.Douglas W. Portmore - 2021 - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
The Reasons Aggregation Theorem.Ralph Wedgwood - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 12:127-148.
Two Grades of Non-consequentialism.Ralph Wedgwood - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):795-814.
Reasons to act, reasons to require, and the two-level theory of moral explanation.Jörg Https://Orcidorg Löschke - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):169-185.
References found in this work
The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability.Stephen L. Darwall - 1996 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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