Atomism, pluralism, and conceptual content

Abstract
Conceptual atomists argue that most of our concepts are primitive. I take up three arguments that have been thought to support atomism and show that they are inconclusive. The evidence that allegedly backs atomism is equally compatible with a localist position on which concepts are structured representations with complex semantic content. I lay out such a localist position and argue that the appropriate position for a non-atomist to adopt is a pluralist view of conceptual structure. I show several ways in which conceptual pluralism provides an advantage in satisfying the empirical and philosophical demands on a theory of conceptual structure and content
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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Reprint years 2009
ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00269.x
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Mind, Language, and Reality.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Origins of Concepts.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (3):359 - 384.
Concepts as Pluralistic Hybrids.Collin Rice - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):597-619.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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