Hume Studies 34 (2):169-187 (2008)

Ruth Weintraub
Tel Aviv University
According to Hume, the paradigm type of inductive reasoning involves a constant conjunction. But, as Price points out, Hume misrepresents ordinary induction: we experience very few constant conjunctions. In this paper, I examine several ways of defending Hume’s account of our practice against Price’s objection, and conclude that the theory cannot be upheld.
Keywords Hume  induction
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ISBN(s) 0319-7336
DOI hume20083429
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