A Solution to the Cable Guy Paradox

Erkenntnis 71 (3):355-359 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The Cable Guy will definitely come between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., and I can bet on one of two possibilities: that he will arrive between 8 and 12, or between 12 and 4. Since I have no more information, it seems (eminently) plausible to suppose the two bets are equally attractive. Yet Hajek has presented a tantalising argument that purports to show that the later interval is, initial appearances to the contrary, more choice-worthy. In this paper, I rebut the argument.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The new paradox of the stone revisited.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2001 - Faith and Philosophy 18 (2):261-268.
On a medieval solution to the liar paradox.Keith Simmons - 1987 - History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (2):121-140.
Probabilistic causality and Simpson's paradox.Richard Otte - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (1):110-125.
The liar paradox in new clothes.Jeff Snapper - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):319-322.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-08-22

Downloads
100 (#159,275)

6 months
3 (#439,232)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ruth Weintraub
Tel Aviv University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Epistemological puzzles about disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.
Belief and the will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 235-256.
Two principles of bayesian epistemology.William Talbott - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (2):135-150.
The Cable Guy paradox.A. Hajek - 2005 - Analysis 65 (2):112-119.

Add more references