Consciousness constrained: A commentary on being no one

Psyche 12 (1) (2006)
Abstract
ABSTRCT: In this commentary, I criticize Metzinger's interdisciplinary approach to fixing the explanandum of a theory of consciousness and I offer a commonsense alternative in its place. I then re-evaluate Metzinger's multi-faceted working concept of consciousness, and argue for a shift away from the notion of "global availability" and towards the notio ns of "perspectivalness" and "transparency." This serves to highlight the role of Metzinger's "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation" (PMIR) in explaining consciousness, and it helps to locate Metzinger's theory in relation to other naturalistic theories of
Keywords *Consciousness States  *Phenomenology  *Self Perception  Subjectivity  Theories
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,803
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Theories of Consciousness.David Papineau - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 353.
Two Senses for 'Givenness of Consciousness'.Pessi Lyyra - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):67-87.
Suffering Without Subjectivity.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (2):99-125.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
1,107 ( #663 of 2,202,716 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #149,904 of 2,202,716 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature