Comments on David Miguel Gray’s “HOT: Keeping up Appearances?”

Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):59-63 (2012)
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Abstract

David Rosenthal and Josh Weisberg have recently provided a counter argument to Ned Block’s argument that a Higher Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness cannot accommodate the existence of hallucinatory conscious states (i.e. a conscious episode consisting of a HOT without the presence of a relevant lower order thought). Their counter argument invokes the idea of mental appearances: a non-existent intentional object which is to aid in an account of subjective conscious awareness. I argue that if mental appearances are to do the work they are supposed to, we cannot draw a mental appearance/reality distinction. I provide an alternative story that a HOT theorist can invoke to account for cases of conscious misrepresentation. Such a story will require denying the existence of hallucinatory conscious states while still accounting for conscious misrepresentation. This is a cost I believe the HOT theorist should be willing to pay.

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Josh Weisberg
University of Houston

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HOT: Keeping up Appearances?David Miguel Gray - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):155-163.

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