Dialectica 36 (2‐3):243-263 (1982)

Authors
Paul Weingartner
University of Salzburg
Abstract
SummaryIn the first part of the paper necessary conditions for the rationality of the notions of belief, knowledge, and assumption are given: Among the different conditions it is stressed that one needs two different concepts of belief, one such that if someone knows something he also believes it, the other exclusive such that if someone knows something he need not to believe it and if he believes it he does not yet know it. Another important point is that deductive infallibility has to be rejected as not being a property of human rationality. Similarly it is not a property of human rationality to know all logical true statements.The second chapter offers a deductive system which meets these and additional conditions of human rationality. The third chapter contains the semantics of the deductive system.RésuméDans le premier chapitre ľauteur énumére des conditions nécessaires à la rationalité des concepts croire, savoir et admettre. Entre autres, il relève qu'il faut distinguer au moins deux concepts croire, qui satisfont ľun àľénoncé: quand quelqu'un sait quelque chose, il la croit aussi, ľautre plus exclusif à: quand quelqu'un sait quelque chose, il n'a pas besoin de la croire et quand quelqu'un la croit , il ne la sait pas . Un autre point très important est que ľinfaillibilité déductive doit être rejetée comme n'appartenant pas à la rationalité humaine. Idem pour la connaissance de tous les énoncés logiquement vrais.Le deuxième chapitre décrit un système déductif qui remplit ces conditions de rationalité . Le troisième, la sémantique de ce système.ZusammenfassungIm ersten Kapitel werden notwendige Bedingungen für die Rationalität der Begriffe Glauben, Wissen und Annehmen gegeben: Unter anderem wird hervorgehoben, dass minde‐stens zwei verschiedene Begriffe von Glauben nötig sind; einmal so, dass gilt: wenn einer etwas weiss, dann glaubt er es auch, und dann auch im exklusiven Sinn: wenn einer etwas weiss, dann braucht er es nicht zu glauben und wenn einer etwas glaubt, dann weiss er es nicht. Ein anderer sehr wichtiger Punkt ist, dass deduktive Infallibilität (d.h. dass man von dem
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.1982.tb00819.x
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References found in this work BETA

New Foundations for Lewis Modal Systems.E. J. Lemmon - 1957 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 22 (2):176-186.
Propositional Attitudes and Extensionality.Czesław Lejewski - 1981 - In Edgar Morscher, Otto Neumaier & Gerhard Zecha (eds.), Philosophie Als Wissenschaft. Comes Verlag. pp. 211--228.

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Citations of this work BETA

Antinomies and Paradoxes and Their Solutions.Paul Weingartner - 1990 - Studies in East European Thought 39 (3-4):313-331.
Antinomies and Paradoxes and Their Solutions.Paul Weingartner - 1990 - Studies in Soviet Thought 39 (3-4):313-331.
Conditions of Rationality for Scientific Research.Paul Weingartner - 2019 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):67-118.

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