Comparing Rubin and Pearl’s causal modelling frameworks: a commentary on Markus (2021)

Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):485-493 (2023)
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Markus (2021) argues that the causal modelling frameworks of Pearl and Rubin are not ‘strongly equivalent’, in the sense of saying ‘the same thing in different ways’. Here I rebut Markus’ arguments against strong equivalence. The differences between the frameworks are best illuminated not by appeal to their causal semantics, but rather reflect pragmatic modelling choices.



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Naftali Weinberger
Tilburg Center For Logic, Ethics, And Philosophy Of Science (TiLPS - Tilburg University)

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Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
Graded Causation and Defaults.Joseph Y. Halpern & Christopher Hitchcock - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):413-457.
Two Concepts of Cause.Elliott Sober - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:405 - 424.
Causal inference of ambiguous manipulations.Peter Spirtes & Richard Scheines - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):833-845.

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