Conditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge

Philosophical Studies 135 (2):179-197 (2007)

Authors
Jonathan Weisberg
University of Toronto at Mississauga
Abstract
Van Fraassen famously endorses the Principle of Reflection as a constraint on rational credence, and argues that Reflection is entailed by the more traditional principle of Conditionalization. He draws two morals from this alleged entailment. First, that Reflection can be regarded as an alternative to Conditionalization – a more lenient standard of rationality. And second, that commitment to Conditionalization can be turned into support for Reflection. Van Fraassen also argues that Reflection implies Conditionalization, thus offering a new justification for Conditionalization. I argue that neither principle entails the other, and thus neither can be used to motivate the other in the way van Fraassen says. There are ways to connect Conditionalization to Reflection, but these connections depend on poor assumptions about our introspective access, and are not tight enough to draw the sorts of conclusions van Fraassen wants. Upon close examination, the two principles seem to be getting at two quite independent epistemic norms.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Religion   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9073-4
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References found in this work BETA

Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 235-256.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection.Frank Arntzenius - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (7):356-370.

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Citations of this work BETA

Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.
Precise Credences.Michael Titelbaum - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPaper Foundation. pp. 1-55.
Distorted Reflection.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85.

View all 25 citations / Add more citations

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