Conditionalization is an intuitive and popular epistemic principle. By contrast, the Reﬂection principle is well known to have some very unappealing consequences. But van Fraassen argues that Conditionalization entails Reﬂection, so that proponents of Conditionalization must accept Reﬂection and its consequences. Van Fraassen also argues that Reﬂection implies Conditionalization, thus oﬀering a new justiﬁcation for Conditionalization. I argue that neither principle entails the other, and thus neither can be used to motivate the other in the way van Fraassen says. I also propose a replacement for Reﬂection that accounts for the intuitions that made Reﬂection appealing, but doesn’t lead to Reﬂection’s bad consequences.
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