Desire as belief, Lewis notwithstanding

Analysis 67 (2):116-122 (2007)
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Abstract

In two curiously neglected papers, David Lewis claims to reduce to absurdity the supposition (commonly labeled DAB) that (some) desires are belief-like. My aim in this paper is to explain the significance of this claim and rebut the proof.

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Citations of this work

Desire.Tim Schroeder - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 (6):631-639.
Types of Uncertainty.Richard Bradley & Mareile Drechsler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1225-1248.

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References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.

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