Indiscriminate evidence, easy knowledge
Offers a diagnosis of the easy knowledge problem, according to which easy knowledge is unjustified belief because the inferences that deliver easy knowledge feign evidential support that is not actually there. This diagnosis leads to a rejection of Closure. But, I argue, this rejection of Closure is more plausible than the traditional one endorsed by tracking theorists. I also argue that my diagnosis suggests a general plausibility argument against Closure, since a number of epistemic goods traditionally associated with knowledge do not transfer across known entailments. Finally, I defend Anti-Closure against two recent objections.
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