Politics, Philosophy and Economics:1470594X2096154 (forthcoming)

Authors
Paul Weithman
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
Peter Vanderschraaf’s Strategic Justice is a powerful elaboration and defense of what he calls ‘justice as mutual advantage’. Vanderschraaf opens Strategic Justice by observing that ‘Plato set a template for all future philosophers by raising two interrelated questions: What precisely is justice? Why should one be just?’. He answers that justice consists of conventions which are followed because each sees that doing so is in her interest. These answers depend upon two conditions which Vanderschraaf calls Baseline Consistency and Negative Mutual Expectations. I contend that the plausibility of the first condition depends upon principles which are prior to Vanderchraaf’s conventions of justice and that the second condition does not account for the interest Vanderschraaf must think we take in those principles. I therefore worry that Vanderschraaf does what he accuses other theorists of justice as mutual advantage of doing: going outside the bounds of justice as mutual advantage. To lay the groundwork for his conditions, Vanderschraaf analyzes the circumstances of justice. I argue that, his claims to the contrary notwithstanding, he does not take the circumstances to be the kind of conditions Hume takes them to be, but that he has good reason to do so.
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DOI 10.1177/1470594x20961540
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References found in this work BETA

A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
Collected Papers. [REVIEW]Thomas E. Hill & John Rawls - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (5):269-272.

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