International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (1):3 – 18 (2001)
It seems obvious that our beliefs are logically imperfect in two ways: they are neither deductively closed nor logically consistent. But this common-sense truism has been judged erroneous by some philosophers in the light of various arguments. In defence of common sense I consider and rebut interpretative arguments for logical perfection and show that the assumption espoused by common sense is theoretically superior, and capable - unlike its rival - of accounting for the informativeness of mathematics. Finally, I suggest that common sense opens the way to genuine disputes about the correct logic.
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Assertion and Conditionals.Peter Carruthers & Anthony Appiah - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (145):566.
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