Shelley Weinberg
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Locke seems to have conflicting commitments: we know individual ideas and all knowledge is propositional. This paper shows the conflict to be only apparent. Looking at Locke’s philosophy of language in relation to the Port Royal logic, I argue, first, that Locke allows that we have non-ideational mental content that is signified only at the linguistic level. Second, I argue that this non-ideational content plays a role in what we know when we know an idea. As a result, we can see our knowledge of an idea as a form of knowledge by acquaintance: there is a direct epistemic relation between a mental object and a knowing subject. But owing to Locke’s logic, that knowledge has a tacit propositional structure expressing the truth of the idea, which gains full signification only linguistically.
Keywords   Acquaintance   Ideas   Knowledge   Port Royal logic   Signification  Acquaintance  Ideas  Knowledge  Locke  Locke  Port Royal logic  Signification
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DOI 10.32881/jomp.121
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