Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):347-370 (2016)

Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Nevertheless, he claims that we know particular things: the identity of our ideas, our own existence, and the existence of external objects. Although much has been done to reconcile the definition of knowledge with our knowledge of external objects, there is virtually nothing in the scholarship when it comes to knowing ideas or our own existence. I fill in this gap by arguing that perceptions of ideas are complex mental states that convey propositional knowledge due to agreeing elements therein
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12066
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An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1979 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 169 (2):221-222.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1689 - Oxford University Press.
Humes Reason.David Owen - 1999 - Oxford University Press.

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