Locke's Reply to the Skeptic

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):389-420 (2013)
Authors
Shelley Weinberg
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Abstract
Given his representationalism how can Locke claim we have sensitive knowledge of the external world? We can see the skeptic as asking two different questions: how we can know the existence of external things, or more specifically how we can know inferentially of the existence of external things. Locke's account of sensitive knowledge, a form of non-inferential knowledge, answers the first question. All we can achieve by inference is highly probable judgment. Because Locke's theory of knowledge includes both first order psychological and second order normative conditions, sensitive knowledge can be non-inferential and less certain than intuitive and demonstrative knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12005
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Locke's Externalism About 'Sensitive Knowledge'.Aaron Bruce Wilson - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (3):425-445.
Self and Sensibility: From Locke to Condillac and Rousseau.Udo Thiel - 2015 - Intellectual History Review 25 (3):257-278.

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