Norms of assertion

Philosophy Compass 2 (2):187–195 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Recently attention has been paid to the epistemic requirements for proper assertion. The most popular account has been the knowledge account, that we can only properly assert what we know. Others have criticized the knowledge account and argued that the norm of assertion is truth, belief, or assertion of what it is reasonable to believe.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00065.x

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 96,594

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Norms of assertion.Graham Oppy - 2007 - In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge. pp. 5--226.
Knowledge and the norms of assertion.John Koethe - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):625-638.
Revisiting norms of assertion.John Turri - 2018 - Cognition 177 (C):8-11.
Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant.Rachel McKinnon - 2015 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
Experimental work on the norms of assertion.John Turri - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (7):e12425.
Problems with Norms of Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):178-207.
Norms of assertion.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 233--250.
Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.
The Norms of Assertion and the Aims of Belief.Sarah Wright - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. New York: Oxford University Press.
Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
253 (#91,695)

6 months
28 (#140,320)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Matt Weiner
University of Vermont

Citations of this work

Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.
Evidential Preemption.Endre Begby - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):515-530.

View all 32 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.
Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.

View all 9 references / Add more references