Erkenntnis 43 (1):67-79 (1995)

Authors
Ruth Weintraub
Tel Aviv University
Abstract
  There are arguments which purport to rebut psychological determinism by appealing to its alleged incompatibility with rationality. I argue that they all fail. Against Davidson, I argue that rationality does not preclude the existence of psychological laws. Against Popper, I argue that rationality is compatible with the possibility of predicting human actions. Against Schlesinger, I claim that Newcomb's problem cannot be invoked to show that human actions are unpredictable. Having vindicated the possibility of a rationally-based theory of action, I consider the form it might take
Keywords Determinism  Metaphysics  Psychology  Rationality
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DOI 10.1007/BF01131840
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References found in this work BETA

Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.). Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
Judgement and Justification.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.
The Poverty of Historicism.Karl Popper - 1957 - London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Causal Decision Theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.

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