Plato’s Moral Psychology

The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 3:302-308 (1998)
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Abstract

I argue that Plato's psychological theories are motivated by concerns he had about moral theory. In particular, Plato rejects the modern account of rationality as the maximization of subjectively evaluated self-interest because, had he adopted such an account, his theory of justice would be subject to criticisms which he holds are fatal to the contractarian theory of justice. While formulating a theory to remain within ethical constraints sometimes violates the canons of scientific theorizing, Plato avoids this mistake.

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Sheldon Wein
Saint Mary's University

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