Regress-stopping and disagreement for epistemic neopragmatists

In David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK (2015)
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Jonathan Weinberg
University of Arizona

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