Remarks on Fodor on having concepts

Mind and Language 19 (1):48-56 (2004)

Daniel Weiskopf
Georgia State University
William Bechtel
University of California, San Diego
Fodor offers a novel argument against Bare-bones Concept Pragmatism (BCP). He alleges that there are two circularities in BCP’s account of concept possession: a circularity in explaining concept possession in terms of the capacity to sort; and a circularity in explaining concept possession in terms of the capacity to draw inferences. We argue that neither of these circles is real.
Keywords Concept  Metaphysics  Possession  Pragmatism  Sorting  Fodor, J
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00246.x
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References found in this work BETA

A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - Studia Logica 54 (1):132-133.
Concepts; A Potboiler.Jerry A. Fodor - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:1-24.
Concepts: A Potboiler.Jerry Fodor - 1994 - Cognition 50 (1-3):95-113.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Rationalist Reply to Fodor's Analyticity and Circularity Challenge.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2013 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 28 (1):7-25.

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