Authors
Ruth Weintraub
Tel Aviv University
Abstract
Hume invokes the separability of perceptions to derive some of his most contentious pronouncements. To assess the cogency of the arguments, the notion must first be clarified. The clarification reveals that sic different separability claims must be distinguished. Of these, I consider the three that are rarely discussed. They turn out to be unacceptable. Locke espouses none of them.This Article does not have an abstract
Keywords separability  Hume  Locke
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DOI 10.1080/09608780701605010
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References found in this work BETA

Hume's Reason.David Owen - 1999 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Type Distinctions of Reason and Hume’s Separability Principle.Hsueh Qu - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (1):90-111.
Kant’s Analytic-Geometric Revolution.Scott Heftler - 2011 - Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin

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