Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):355–374 (2007)

Authors
Joan Weiner
Indiana University, Bloomington
Abstract
It is widely assumed that the methods and results of science have no place among the data to which our semantics of vague predicates must answer. This despite the fact that it is well known that such prototypical vague predicates as ‘is bald’ play a central role in scientific research (e.g. the research that established Rogaine as a treatment for baldness). I argue here that the assumption is false and costly: in particular, I argue one cannot accept either supervaluationist semantics, or the criticism of that semantics offered by Fodor and Lepore, without having to abandon accepted, and unexceptionable, scientific methodology.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00297.x
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References found in this work BETA

Vagueness, Truth and Logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
Vagueness Without Paradox.Diana Raffman - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):41-74.
Hat-Tricks and Heaps.W. D. Hart - 1991 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 33:1-24.

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