Analysis 64 (1):8-10 (2004)

Authors
Ruth Weintraub
Tel Aviv University
Abstract
I defend the suggestion that the rational probability in the Sleeping Beauty paradox is one third. The reasoning in its favour is familiar: for every heads-waking, there are two tails-wakings. To complete the defense, I rebut the reasoning which purports to justify the competing suggestion – that the correct probability is half – by undermining its premise, that no new information has been received.
Keywords belief  paradox  rationality
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/analys/64.1.8
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,363
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga.David Lewis - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):171–76.
The Doomsday Argument and the Number of Possible Observers.Ken D. Olum - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):164-184.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief.David Builes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3033-3049.
Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.

View all 32 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-02-04

Total views
50 ( #211,660 of 2,445,393 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #310,973 of 2,445,393 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes