Static-Dynamic Hybridity in Dynamical Models of Cognition

Philosophy of Science 89 (2):283-301 (2022)
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Abstract

Dynamical models of cognition have played a central role in recent cognitive science. In this paper, we consider a common strategy by which dynamical models describe their target systems neither as purely static nor as purely dynamic, but rather using a hybrid approach. This hybridity reveals how dynamical models involve representational choices that are important for understanding the relationship between dynamical and non-dynamical representations of a system.

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Author Profiles

Naftali Weinberger
Tilburg Center For Logic, Ethics, And Philosophy Of Science (TiLPS - Tilburg University)
Colin Allen
University of California, Santa Barbara

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References found in this work

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How scientific models can explain.Alisa Bokulich - 2011 - Synthese 180 (1):33 - 45.

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