History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (1):21-40 (2008)
AbstractLocke has been accused of failing to have a coherent understanding of consciousness, since it can be identical neither to reflection nor to ordinary perception without contradicting other important commitments. I argue that the account of consciousness is coherent once we see that, for Locke, perceptions of ideas are complex mental acts and that consciousness can be seen as a special kind of self-referential mental state internal to any perception of an idea.
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Citations of this work
Locke on the Ontology of Persons.Jessica Gordon-Roth - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):97-123.
Self Visitation, Traveler Time, and Compatible Properties.John W. Carroll - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):359-370.
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References found in this work
Locke: "Our Knowledge, Which All Consists in Propositions".Ruth Marie Mattern - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):677 - 695.
Locke and the Issue Over Innateness.Margaret Atherton - 1998 - In Vere Chappell (ed.), Locke. Oxford University Press. pp. 48--59.
‘Epistemologism’ and Early Modern Debates About Individuation and Identity.Udo Thiel - 1997 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 5 (2):353-372.