The Epistemological Views of a “Social Behaviorist”

Tulane Studies in Philosophy 18:123-130 (1969)
The article develops g.h. mead's social behaviorist contention that adult knowledge results not merely from testing beliefs derived from sensory perception but also from the physical and social context in which beliefs are expressed. by showing the role of language in knowledge, the actual conditions of knowledge are described rather than prescribed
Keywords General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0082-6766
DOI 10.5840/tulane1969188
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