Three Kinds of Idealization

Journal of Philosophy 104 (12):639-659 (2007)

Authors
Michael Weisberg
University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
Philosophers of science increasingly recognize the importance of idealization: the intentional introduction of distortion into scientific theories. Yet this recognition has not yielded consensus about the nature of idealization. e literature of the past thirty years contains disparate characterizations and justifications, but little evidence of convergence towards a common position
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.5840/jphil20071041240
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