The origins of concepts

Philosophical Studies 140 (3):359 - 384 (2008)
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Abstract

Certain of our concepts are innate, but many others are learned. Despite the plausibility of this claim, some have argued that the very idea of concept learning is incoherent. I present a conception of learning that sidesteps the arguments against the possibility of concept learning, and sketch several mechanisms that result in the generation of new primitive concepts. Given the rational considerations that motivate their deployment, I argue that these deserve to be called learning mechanisms. I conclude by replying to the objections that these mechanisms cannot produce genuinely new content and cannot be part of genuinely cognitive explanations

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2009-01-28

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Daniel Weiskopf
Georgia State University

Citations of this work

Précis of the origin of concepts.Susan Carey - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):113-124.
Can Bootstrapping Explain Concept Learning?Jacob Beck - 2017 - Cognition 158 (C):110–121.
Theoretical terms without analytic truths.Michael Strevens - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):167-190.

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