Synthese 169 (1):145-173 (2009)

Abstract
Traditionally, theories of concepts in psychology assume that concepts are a single, uniform kind of mental representation. But no single kind of representation can explain all of the empirical data for which concepts are responsible. I argue that the assumption that concepts are uniformly the same kind of mental structure is responsible for these theories’ shortcomings, and outline a pluralist theory of concepts that rejects this assumption. On pluralism, concepts should be thought of as being constituted by multiple representational kinds, with the particular kind of concept used on an occasion being determined by the context. I argue that endorsing pluralism does not lead to eliminativism about concepts as an object of scientific interest
Keywords Concepts  Representation  Pluralism  Categorization  Psychological kinds
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-008-9340-8
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References found in this work BETA

Vison.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.

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Citations of this work BETA

Metacognitive Development and Conceptual Change in Children.Joulia Smortchkova & Nicholas Shea - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
Water is and is Not H 2 O.Kevin P. Tobia, George E. Newman & Joshua Knobe - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (2):183-208.
The Big Concepts Paper: A Defence of Hybridism.Agustín Vicente & Fernando Martínez Manrique - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):59-88.

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