What makes a causal theory of content anti-skeptical?

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):299-318 (1996)
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Abstract

Recently some arguments against Cartesian-style skepticism have been based on causal theories of content. I hope to show that the relevance of causal theories of content to what we can know is conditional in a more complex way than has been recognized so far.

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The evolving fortunes of eliminative materialism.Paul M. Churchland - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.

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