Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):460-470 (1995)
There are very few philosophical issues which are so intimately associated with one single philosopher as is the problem of induction with Hume. This paper argues against this received opinion. It shows that Hume was neither the first to think induction problematic, nor the originator of the argument he adduced in support of the (sceptical) position. It then explains his (more modest) contribution. Its primary concern, however, is not historical. By considering Hume’s contribution to the problem of induction, it is argued, we can come to a better understanding of this recalcitrant problem.
|Keywords||induction Hume scepticism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
A Material Dissolution of the Problem of Induction.John D. Norton - 2013 - Synthese 191 (4):1-20.
On Not Changing the Problem: A Reply to Howson.Daniel Steel - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (3):285 - 291.
Evidential Support, Reliability, and Hume's Problem of Induction.Chris Tucker - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):503-519.
How Popper [Might Have] Solved the Problem of Induction.Alan Musgrave - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (1):19-31.
Waiting for Hume.Peter Lipton - 2005 - In Marina Frasca-Spada & P. J. E. Kail (eds.), Impressions of Hume. Oxford University Press. pp. 59.
Hume on Induction: A Genuine Problem or Theology's Trojan Horse?Stephen J. Boulter - 2002 - Philosophy 77 (1):67-86.
Counterfactual Conditionals and the Presuppositions of Induction.William Todd - 1964 - Philosophy of Science 31 (2):101-110.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads237 ( #15,200 of 2,169,146 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #60,916 of 2,169,146 )
How can I increase my downloads?