Emergence, supervenience, and realization

Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):39-51 (2002)

Abstract

  In the first section of this paper, I articulate Jaegwon Kim's argument against emergent down ward causation. In the second section, I canvas four responses to Kim's argument and argue that each fails. In the third section, I show that emergent downward causation does not, contra Kim, entail overdetermination. I argue that supervenience of emergent upon base properties is not sufficient for nomological causal relationsbetween emergent and base properties. What sustains Kim's argument is rather the claim that emergent properties realized by base properties can have no causal powers distinct from those base properties. I argue that this is false

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References found in this work

Making Sense of Emergence.Jaegwon Kim - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):3-36.
How Properties Emerge.Paul Humphreys - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):1-17.
Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):257-70.
The Search for Ontological Emergence.Michael Silberstein & John Mcgeever - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (195):201-214.

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