Emergence, supervenience, and realization

Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):39-51 (2002)
Abstract
  In the first section of this paper, I articulate Jaegwon Kim's argument against emergent down ward causation. In the second section, I canvas four responses to Kim's argument and argue that each fails. In the third section, I show that emergent downward causation does not, contra Kim, entail overdetermination. I argue that supervenience of emergent upon base properties is not sufficient for nomological causal relationsbetween emergent and base properties. What sustains Kim's argument is rather the claim that emergent properties realized by base properties can have no causal powers distinct from those base properties. I argue that this is false
Keywords Causation  Emergence  Metaphysics  Property  Realization  Supervenience  Kim, J
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1015755913389
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Realist Ethical Naturalism for Ethical Non-Naturalists.Ryan Stringer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):339-362.

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