No Surprises

Erkenntnis 86 (2):389-406 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The surprise exam paradox is an apparently sound argument to the apparently absurd conclusion that a surprise exam cannot be given within a finite exam period. A closer look at the logic of the paradox shows the argument breaking down immediately. So why do the beginning stages of the argument appear sound in the first place? This paper presents an account of the paradox on which its allure is rooted in a common probabilistic mistake: the base rate fallacy. The account predicts that the paradoxical argument should get less and less convincing as it goes along—a prediction I take to be welcome. On a bleaker note, the account suggests that the base rate fallacy may be more widespread than previously thought.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox.Ken Levy - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158.
How to expect a surprising exam.Brian Kim & Anubav Vasudevan - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3101-3133.
The surprise exam paradox: a note on formulating it and a solution to it.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2019 - Ethos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 12 (2):181-186.
Logic and the Surprise Exam Paradox.Margarita Vázquez - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 13:121-127.
Exhuming the No-Miracles Argument.Colin Howson - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):205-211.
The Surprise Exam Paradox.John N. Williams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:67-94.
The Surprise Exam Paradox.John N. Williams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:67-94.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-03-15

Downloads
79 (#191,748)

6 months
6 (#201,673)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ian Wells
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.
On the psychology of prediction.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1973 - Psychological Review 80 (4):237-251.

View all 31 references / Add more references