Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):511-518 (2020)

Daniel Weltman
Ashoka University
Melis Erdur has argued that there is something morally wrong with moral realism. Moral realism promotes morally objectionable lethargy by recommending that we accept moral knowledge that could be acquired effortlessly. This is morally objectionable, because morality requires us to be reflective about moral truths. I argue that the moral realist need not be worried, because if reflection about morality is a genuine value, the realist can accept this: moral realism entails no prescriptions about how one morally ought to acquire moral knowledge. It is merely a metaphysical thesis about the ontological status of moral truthmakers. If we ought to be reflective, moral realism can accept this. Moreover, Erdur’s argument generalizes to moral anti-realism, so the moral realist in particular has nothing to worry about.
Keywords Moral Realism  Moral Anti-Realism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10790-019-09723-3
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,339
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.
A Defense of Moral Deference.David Enoch - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (5):229-258.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

I Can't Relax! You're Driving Me Quasi!Stephen Ingram - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).
Hume's Moral Realism.John Frank Corvino - 1998 - Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin
Question Authority: In Defense of Moral Naturalism Without Clout.Jon Tresan - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):221 - 238.
Non-Cognitivism and Inconsistency.Folke Tersman - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):361-372.
Blackburn's Problem: On Its Not Insignificant Residue.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383.
Science’s Immunity to Moral Refutation.Alex Barber - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):633-653.
Blackburn’s Problem: On Its Not Insignificant Residue.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383.
Blackburn’s Problem: On Its Not Insignificant Residue.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383.
Nonassertive Moral Abolitionism.Jason Dockstader - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (4):481-502.
Moral Perception and the Reliability Challenge.David Faraci - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (1):63-73.


Added to PP index

Total views
52 ( #204,752 of 2,448,786 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #97,100 of 2,448,786 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes