Rebooting the new evidence scholarship

International Journal of Evidence and Proof 24 (4):351-373 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The new evidence scholarship addresses three distinct approaches: legal probabilism, Bayesian decision theory and relative plausibility theory. Each has major insights to offer, but none seems satisfactory as it stands. This paper proposes that relative plausibility theory be modified in two substantial ways. The first is by defining its key concept of plausibility, hitherto treated as primitive, by generalising the standard axioms of probability. The second is by complementing the descriptive component of the theory with a normative decision theory adapted to legal process. Because this version of decision theory is based on plausibilities rather than probabilities, it generates plausibilistic expectations as outputs. Because these outputs are comparable, they function as relative plausibilities. Hence the resulting framework is an extension of relative plausibility theory, but it retains deep ties to legal probabilism, through the proposed definition of plausibility, and to Bayesian decision theory, through the normative use of decision theory.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,075

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Bayesian probability.Patrick Maher - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):119 - 127.
Relative plausibility and a prescriptive theory of evidence assessment.Eivind Kolflaath - 2019 - International Journal of Evidence and Proof 23 (1-2):121-127.
New Tools for Theory Choice and Theory Diagosis.John R. Welch - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):318-329.
New tools for theory choice and theory diagnosis.John R. Welch - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):318-329.
Decision theory and cognitive choice.John R. Welch - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):147-172.
Bayesian Decision Theory and Stochastic Independence.Philippe Mongin - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (1):152-178.
Coping with Ethical Uncertainty.John R. Welch - 2017 - Diametros 53:150-166.
Rational Decisions.Ken Binmore - 2009 - Princeton University Press.
Rational Decisions.Ken Binmore - 2008 - Princeton University Press.
Countable Additivity, Idealization, and Conceptual Realism.Yang Liu - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (1):127-147.
An introduction to decision theory.Martin Peterson - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-10-26

Downloads
33 (#485,230)

6 months
9 (#309,818)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John R. Welch
Saint Louis University - Madrid Campus

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references