On Wittgenstein's notion of meaning-blindness: Its subjective, objective and aesthetic aspects

Philosophical Investigations 33 (3):201-219 (2010)

Abstract

Wittgenstein in his later years thought about experiences of meaning and aspect change. Do such experiences matter? Or would a meaning- or aspect-blind person not lose much? Moreover, is this a matter of aesthetics or epistemology? To get a better perspective on these matters, I will introduce distinctions between certain subjective and objective aspects, namely feelings of our inner psychological states versus fine-tuned objective experiences of the outer world. It seems to me that in his discussion of meaning-blindness, Wittgenstein unhappily floats between these two extremes, the subjective and the objective. I will also introduce some notions from Kant's aesthetics, to get a better understanding of the interplay between feeling and meaning. This will shed some new light on Wittgenstein's enquiry into meaning- and aspect-blindness.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,694

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-07-24

Downloads
106 (#113,372)

6 months
1 (#388,319)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christian Wenzel
National Taiwan University

References found in this work

The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1998 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Critique of the Power of Judgment.Immanuel Kant - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work

Add more citations