Climate models, confirmation and calibration

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):609-635 (2013)
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Abstract

We argue that concerns about double-counting -- using the same evidence both to calibrate or tune climate models and also to confirm or verify that the models are adequate --deserve more careful scrutiny in climate modelling circles. It is widely held that double-counting is bad and that separate data must be used for calibration and confirmation. We show that this is far from obviously true, and that climate scientists may be confusing their targets. Our analysis turns on a Bayesian/relative-likelihood approach to incremental confirmation. According to this approach, double-counting is entirely proper. We go on to discuss plausible difficulties with calibrating climate models, and we distinguish more and less ambitious notions of confirmation. Strong claims of confirmation may not, in many cases, be warranted, but it would be a mistake to regard double-counting as the culprit

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Author Profiles

Katie Steele
Australian National University
Charlotte Sophie Werndl
London School of Economics

Citations of this work

Calibration: Modelling the Measurement Process.Eran Tal - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 65:33-45.
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Predictivism and Old Evidence: A Critical Look at Climate Model Tuning.Mathias Frisch - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):171-190.
The Philosophy of Logical Practice.Ben Martin - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (2-3):267-283.

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References found in this work

Prediction Versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting.Christopher Hitchcock & Elliott Sober - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):1-34.
II—Wendy S. Parker: Confirmation and Adequacy-for-Purpose in Climate Modelling.Wendy S. Parker - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):233-249.
Measuring Confirmation and Evidence.Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):663-672.
II—C Onfirmation and A Dequacy-for-P Urpose in C Limate M Odelling.Wendys Parker - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):233-249.

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