Irreducibly collective existence and bottomless nihilism

Synthese 200 (2):1-16 (2022)
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Abstract

This paper develops the metaphysical hypothesis that there are irreducibly collective pluralities, pluralities of objects that do not have a singular object among them. A way to formulate this hypothesis using plural quantification will be proposed and the coherence of irreducibly collective existence will be defended. Furthermore, irreducibly collective existence will be shown to allow for bottomless scenarios that do not involve things standing in relations of parthood. This will create logical space for an anti-atomistic form of mereological nihilism.

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Jonas Werner
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Metaphysical explanation and the cosmological argument.Thomas Oberle - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (6):1413-1432.

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References found in this work

Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.Peter F. Strawson - 1959 - London, England: Routledge. Edited by Wenfang Wang.
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.Peter Frederick Strawson - 1959 - London, England: Routledge. Edited by Wenfang Wang.
The question of realism.Kit Fine - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1:1-30.

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