Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience

Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (3):294-317 (2016)

Authors
Preston Werner
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Abstract
_ Source: _Page Count 24 I defend the thesis that at least some moral properties can be part of the contents of experience. I argue for this claim using a contrast argument, a type of argument commonly found in the literature on the philosophy of perception. I first appeal to psychological research on what I call emotionally empathetic dysfunctional individuals to establish a phenomenal contrast between eedis and normal individuals in some moral situations. I then argue that the best explanation for this contrast, assuming non-skeptical moral realism, is that badness is represented in the normal individual’s experience but not in the eedi’s experience. I consider and reject four alternative explanations of the contrast
Keywords moral perception   moral epistemology   metaethics   ethics   moral realism   perception of higher-order properties
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1163/17455243-4681063
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References found in this work BETA

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
.Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Hard Look at Moral Perception.David Faraci - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2055-2072.

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