Analysis 80 (1):90-95 (2020)

Authors
Jonas Werner
University of Bern
Abstract
In a recent article published in this journal, Kris McDaniel proposes a variant of Peter van Inwagen’s argument against the principle of sufficient reason that makes crucial use of plural grounding. In this response paper I object to McDaniel’s argument. I argue that there is no notion of plural grounding available that is both irreflexive in the sense required for the argument to go through and general enough to formulate the principle of sufficient reason as proposed by McDaniel.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anz038
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References found in this work BETA

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
On the Plurality of Grounds.Shamik Dasgupta - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
An Essay on Free Will.Michael Slote - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (6):327-330.
Pure Logic of Many-Many Ground.Jon Litland - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (5):531-577.

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Citations of this work BETA

Facts.Kevin Mulligan - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Principle of Sufficient Reason.Fatema Amijee - 2020 - In Michael J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding. New York: Routledge. pp. 63-75.

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